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Dilemmas nested inside dilemmas appear to be able to defeat a set 
of principals attempting to solve collective-action problems 
through the design of new institutions to alter the structure of the 
LQFHQWLYHVWKH\IDFH«%XWVRPHLQGLYLGXDOVKDYHFUHDWHG
institutions, committed themselves to follow rules, and monitored 
their own conformance to their agreements, as well as their 
conformance to the rules in common pool of resources situations. 
Elinor Orstrom (1994) 
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Cooperatives are characterised by mutual-benefit coordination mechanisms aimed at the fulfilment 
of  PHPEHUV¶ SDUWLFLSDWLRQ ULJKWV 7KLV SDSHU H[SORUHV WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDO HOHPHQWV WKDW UHJXODWH
individual  behaviour  and  outcomes  in  cooperatives  by  bringing  together  new-institutionalism, 
behavioural and evolutionary economics. Our framework considers four main dimensions of the 
governance of cooperative firms: (1) the development and application of self-defined rules by the 
members of the cooperative; (2) the management, and appropriation of common resources and 
outcomes;  (3)  intrinsic  motivations  and  reciprocating  behaviours;  (4)  the  implementation  of 
suitable incentive mixes based on inclusion and reciprocity, including both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary  elements.  An  example  is  offered  in  order  to  highlight  possible  problems  in  the 
governance of cooperative firms, in particular the processes of distribution and appropriation of 
surplus. The example aims at introducing the discussion of the new framework of analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
Cooperative firms are understood, in this paper, as mutual benefit organisations created by self-organised 
principals  (Ostrom,  1994). These  are  directly  invested  of  the responsibility  to  define  and  pursue  the 
objectives of their organisation.
1 It follows that cooperative firms are created to protect, first of all, the 
participation rights of their membership in order to satisfy its needs and demands. Cooperatives do not, as 
a  norm,  maximise  private  returns  accruing  to  the  investment  of  financial  capital.  They  are  usually 
controlled on an equal voting-right basis by different typologies of patrons (e.g. producers, workers, 
consumers) or by a mix of them (multi-stakeholder cooperatives). Since the organisation is created to 
pursue  objectives  other  than  the  ones  of  investors,  private  objectives  vested  in  external  owners  are 
substituted with mutual-benefit aims. This puts the burden of the fulfilment of economic, financial, and 
organisational requirements directly on the self-organised principals. External financiers have, as a norm, 
limited incentives to invest in cooperatives, both because private returns to investment in specific assets 
are much reduced with respect to for-profit firms, and because the lack of control rights increases the risks 
of  losses  and  of  morally  hazardous  behaviours  by  the  self-organised  principals.
2  Those  peculiar 
governance  characteristics  require  appropriate  analytical  tools.  Whilst  the  contributions  of  new 
institutional, behavioural
3  and  evolutionary  economics
4  have  provided insights on  specific  aspects of 
                                                       
1Mutuality is considered by various authors to be directly linked to the reciprocating behaviour of the involved 
actors (Bruni and Zamagni, 2007) and to inclusive versus exclusive preferences (Sacchetti and Tortia, 2010). 
 
2A second typology of non-profit making firms is represented by social enterprises (or entrepreneurial non-profit 
organisations with a public benefit objective), which find, only partially, their organisational expression in the 
cooperative form (Borzaga and Tortia, 2010). This work will refer mostly to cooperative firms, though many of 
the arguments developed here can be applied to other typologies of non-profit oriented firms. 
3 Analyses of individual behaviour carried out by the behavioural school question the hypothesis that every human 
action, and especially every economic action, is governed exclusively by self-interest. Behavioural economics main-
tains instead that human actions spring from a mix of motivations and preferences. The approach of behavioural 
economics was firstly inspired by developments in social psychology (e.g., DeCharms, 1968; Deci, 1975), which 
took into consideration the relevance of intrinsic and non-monetary motivations. Then it sprang in economics in 
connection with the doctrine of limited rationality (Simon, 1979) and decision making under risk (Khaneman and 
Tversky, 1979). Frey (1997) evidenced the interplay between intrinsic motivations and extrinsic incentives. Behav-
ioural economics introduce social preferences as crucial drives of behaviours. Social preferences include behaviours 
that are not-self-interested since people can decide driven by the interest for the wellbeing of others (altruism), by a 
general inclination to reciprocity (Fehr and Gächter, 2000) and by a quest for justice and equity (Fehr and Schmidt, 
2001; Tyler and Blader, 2000).!  3 
economic choice, we argue that each stream taken separately does not define a comprehensive framework 
for  analysing  the  behaviour  and  goals  of  cooperatives.  This  work  is  positioned  to  fill  that  gap,  by 
introducing a new framework of analysis. 
New-institutionalism is one of the most influential schools in understanding choices across markets and 
organisations.  It  has  been  deeply  involved  with  the  study  of  opportunistic  behaviours  facing  asset 
specificity, contrasting interests and asymmetric information (Williamson, 1973; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). These problems are relevant in the study of the management and distribution of common resources 
(Ostrom, 1994). However, the new-institutionalist framework is not suited for DFFRPPRGDWLQJDFWRUV¶
motivations. Even when called into play, motivations are mostly taken as exogenous to the explanatory 
framework. However, motivations are likely to be crucial in clarifying the behaviour on non-traditional 
forms  of  enterprises,  such  as  cooperative  firms  and  social  enterprises.  In  these  organizations,  as 
demonstrated by a literature that grew overtime (Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Ben-Ner and Putterman 1998; 
Leete, 2000; Ben-Ner and Gui, 2003; Borzaga and Tortia 2006; Valentinov, 2007, 2008) motivations are 
not  exclusively  related  to  monetary  qualities,  since  at  the  outset,  when  the  organisation  is  created, 
principals  attach  value  also  to  reciprocating  behaviours,  inclusion  in  the  choice  of  strategies  and 
objectives,  fair  procedures,  and  socially  oriented  goals. An  explanatory  framework  that  assesses  the 
interplay of both extrinsic and intrinsic motivations is therefore needed.  
The mix of motivations and associated values requires coordination. Building on evolutionary theory, we 
take routines as the coordinators of the activities undertaken by self-organised principals. We understand 
routines as shared and established ways of dealing with specific management and production issues that 
help the alignment of individual motivations and organisational objectives.  Routines, in this context, 
represent evolving mechanisms incentivising consistence between collective and individual values and 
objectives, including not only monetary elements but also inclusion, fairness, learning and autonomy, 
respect and recognition, reciprocity and individual wellbeing. 
The strategy of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we consider the economic nature of cooperative 
firms, in terms of entrepreneurial activity self-organised by non investor principals. Section 2 introduces 
                                                                                                                                                                           
4 Evolutionism in the study of the economy was initiated by Penrose (1959) and is based upon the idea that 
organizational routines in the social world serve a similar function to genetic material in the biotic world (Nelson 
and Winter 1982). Organizational routines serve as codes (replicators) transmitting instructions that support the 
behavioural propensities of the organization, which can be interpreted as interlocking equilibria of individual habits 
(Hodgson 1993, 2006). These routines can be renewed through organizational innovation and transmitted by 
imitation, and they define the potential for adaptation and survival in the socio-economic environment. According to 
evolutionary theory, institutions take the form of organizational routines in terms of property rights, governance 
structures, and organizational models.   4 
an example of cooperative misbehaviour in order to illustrate some of the main dangers connected with 
the  process  of  appropriation  and  distribution  of  resources  in  inclusive  governance  forms.  The 
organisational dilemmas introduced in Section 2 are taken up in Section 3, where we introduce a new 
framework of analysis that accounts for the monetary and non-monetary qualities of cooperatives. In 
particular, we argue that pluralism of values, represented also by multiple motivations, should be reflected 
by self-defined rules, routines, and mix of incentives. Performance would be then assessed on the basis of 
such values. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The socio-economic nature of cooperative firms 
Cooperative firms are regarded in this paper as non-profit oriented firms. This interpretation marks some 
of their most fundamental institutional and behavioural features as against profit maximising firms. Profit 
maximisation  typically  depends  on the economic  nature  and institutional features  of  investor-owned, 
business firms. The latter have been conceptualised as saleable objects (Putterman, 1988), which implies 
that owners aim at maximising market value and being in a position to sell the firm (or its shares) at the 
highest possible  price. The  maximisation  of  market  value  requires  that  expected  profits  are, in turn, 
maximised. 
In  the  case  of  cooperatives  firms  a  different  process  can  be  observed,  although  not  necessarily  so, 
depending on the institutional and legal context.
5 To illustrate, let us consider the Italian and the Spanish 
legislations as two specific cases in which explicit emphasis is placed on the non-profit orientation of 
cooperatives. In particular: (1) cooperatives are required to reinvest at least part of the net surpluses in 
asset-locked  reserves  that  are  exclusively  owned  by  the  organisation  and  cannot  be  appropriated  by 
members also in the case of de-mutualisation and/or sale of the firm; (2) members rights are personal 
rights and cannot be sold as such in the market. In other words, the market for membership rights is 
excluded or severely restricted by law. Both categories of institutional constraints make the sale of the 
firm more difficult and less convenient, dampening the tendency to consider the organisation as a saleable 
object.
6 
                                                       
5 When the non-profit orientation is not imposed by law, as it happens in most Anglo-Saxon countries, diverse 
outcomes and behaviours can be observed, including profit maximising ones. These are usually linked to income 
maximising choices by members and to the possibility offered by law to de-mutualise and sell the organisation at 
its highest possible market price. However, the empirical evidence shows that many cooperatives in these national 
contexts still behave as non-profit-maximising and/or community oriented firms. 
6Starting from the seminal contributions by Furubortn and Pejovich (1970), and by Vanek (1970), these institutional 
features have attracted serious criticisms against cooperative firms, since they have been considered the source of   5 
In  our  perspective,  the  nature  of  cooperative  firms  is  given  by  the  need  to  device  mutual-benefit 
coordination  mechanisms  for  the  fulfilment  of  social  rights  and  needs  coming  from  non-investor 
stakeholders. Such needs would include, for example, the stability of employment and a fair wage for 
workers in worker cooperatives, access to financial support for little producers in credit cooperatives, 
adequate quality and product prices for customers in consumer cooperatives.
7 
More even distribution with respect to for-profit firms, however, does not have to happen at the expenses 
of efficiency. Cooperatives have been shown to be able to reach high degrees of production efficiency, at 
times higher than profit maximising firms (Bartlett, et al., 1992). These results can be explained by the 
ability of cooperatives to implement effective coordination and governing mechanisms that favour the 
PXWXDODOLJQPHQWRIPHPEHUV¶PRWLYDWLRQVDQGREMHFWLYHVRQWKHRQHKDQGDQGRUJDQLVDWLRQDOREMHFWLYHV
on the other. In practice, consistency between individual and collective objectives can be evolved by 
means of democratic participation and deliberation as a method for discussion and strategic decision-
making  (Sacchetti  and  Sugden,  2009).  Results  are  likely  to  include  improved  organisational  and 
production efficiency, as well as individuals' satisfaction (Stiglitz, 2009). The former can be significantly 
improved vis à vis profit making-firms when trust and reciprocating behaviours are built in organisational 
routines (Becchetti, 2010). The latter has been related by Deci and Ryan (2000) to the individual's basic 
psychological  needs  ±  namely  competence,  autonomy  and  relatedness  ±  to  which  social  contextual 
conditions must comply if the individual has to be satisfied. These findings suggest that when extrinsic 
goals differ from intrinsically determined needs, the wellbeing of the individual diminishes. Participation 
                                                                                                                                                                           
dynamic inefficiencies in the allocation and accumulation of self-financed capital funds (Bonin, et al., 1993). These 
considerations were initially referred to the former Yugoslav economic system, and then extended to all the forms of 
cooperative firms characterised by the accumulation of capital in asset-locked reserves. However, while the ensuing 
phenomenon of under-investment and under-capitalisation has found weak empirical support (Bartlett, et. al, 1992), 
these contributions have failed to recognise the positive functions of the asset lock,
 and to evidence its coherence 
with the non-profit nature of cooperatives.   
 
7We do not question here the legitimacy of the analysis of the behavioural responses of cooperatives as income 
maximising firms, as in the research tradition initiated by the Ward (1958) model. Such analytical approach was able 
to define testable hypothesis that have been confirmed by empirical tests, such as the lower responsiveness of 
cooperative firms to market shock than profit maximising firms (Pencavel et al., 2006). However, the hypothesis of 
income maximisation also led to wrong implications, such as the possibility of a negatively sloped supply curve in 
the Ward (1958) model, envisaging serious misunderstandings of the economic nature of cooperatives.
 Furthermore, 
the Ward model takes for granted the institutional environment in which cooperatives operate, as this environment 
was largely drawn from the legal constraints imposed on self-managed firms in the former Yugoslav system. Hence, 
the role of institutions and their change is taken as exogenous.   6 
in the formation of organisational objectives, besides some degree of internalisation of organisational 
characteristics, can  render organisational goals consistent with individuals' internal values and needs, 
improving satisfaction and wellbeing (Cf. Carpita et al., 2010 for evidence). Finally, the lower utilisation 
of monetary incentives and the stronger stress put on intrinsic motivations and involvement are conducive 
to reduce costs and to increase competitiveness (Borzaga e Tortia, 2010). 
These results contradicts the nature of traditional analysis of cooperative firms, which often disregards the 
role of motivational complexity in shaping the interplay between self-interested and exclusive orientations 
on the one hand, and cooperative behaviours on the other. By reducing human behaviour to the expression 
of exclusive and individualistic motivations the possibility to understand the behavioural underpinnings 
of cooperation is lost. The analysis is therefore constrained, and cannot explain rules and objectives, nor 
can it explain the multiplicity of results of cooperatives as particular associative entrepreneurial forms. It 
follows  that  the behavioural  propensities  of the actors  involved, including  the  mesh  of  intrinsic  and 
extrinsic  motivations,  inclusive  and  exclusive  preferences  need  to  be  properly  integrated  in  the 
organisational context. To this objective, incentive mixes represent an emergent property of complex 
organisations whose function is to make coherent, while, at the same, leave the interaction open between 
individual behaviour and organisational objectives.  While traditional economic approaches have almost 
solely focused on monetary incentives, we endorse a different perspective whereby monetary outcomes 
represent only part of the desired end results (Borzaga and Mittone, 1997; Bacchiega and Borzaga, 2001). 
We  regard  non-pecuniary  aspects  such  as  learning,  recognition,  fairness,  autonomy,  and  inclusion  in 
decision-PDNLQJDVLQWHJUDWLYHIRXQGDWLRQDOTXDOLWLHVRIDFRRSHUDWLYHV¶PHPEHUVKLS7KHVHDUHPLUURUHG
by  rules and  routines,  as well as  by  organisational objectives,  against  which performance  should be 
measured (Sacchetti and Tortia, 2010).
8 
 
3. Dark side of cooperation: appropriation and distribution 
Economic analysis has shown behavioural diversities not only in individuals, but also at the collective 
level  between  cooperative  and  for-profit  firms.  For  example,  worker  cooperatives  tend  to  protect 
employment to a larger extent than capitalist firms. To this end, worker members are ready to accept 
fluctuating  wages  (Craig  and  Pencavel,  1992,  1994;  Pecavel,  et  al.,  2006;  Burdin  and  Dean,  2009). 
Different  attitudes  can  be  also  found  in  cooperative  banks,  which  tend  to  be  created  for  providing 
financial support to small producers, who would otherwise be rationed by commercial banks. 
                                                       
8$VVXPPDULVHGE\.DKQHPDQHWDOS³QXPHURXVVWXGLHVKDYHHVWDEOLVKHGWKDWOLIHVDWLVIDFWLRQLV
ZHDNO\FRUUHODWHGZLWKLQFRPH´ 
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Most of the analysis concerning cooperative firms, however, has tended either to support their behaviour 
in a hagiographic way, or to devalue their role and results with ideological arguments (Borzaga, et al., 
2009). Shared objectives and voluntary compliance with managerial decisions add significant complexity 
to the analysis. Inclusive governance requires an understanding of the conditions under which individuals 
accept to behave cooperatively, as against free riding and opportunism. A number of issues still call for 
critical inquiry, for example: failures to reach the desired objectives; instances of misalignment between 
individual  and  organisational  objectives;  the  spread  of  opportunism  and  breakdowns  in  coordination 
engendered  by  contrasts  between  different  members  or  between  members  and  managers.  These 
difficulties are recurring in cooperative firms and cast doubts on whether cooperatives represent welfare-
increasing governance solutions. In a recently published article on the  New York Times, Castle (2009) 
describes  the  fraudulent  conduct  of  some  European  agricultural  cooperatives  in  the  adjudication  of 
European subsidies: 
³%HFDXVHWKHFRRSHUDWLYHVSURYLGHDJULFXOWXUDOHTXLSPHQWIDUPHUVVRPHWLPHVVLJQIRUPVJLYLQJFR-
ops the right to withdraw money from their individual accounts, in the way that many people pay 
household bills. But fraud investigators found this to be happening even to farmers who had not 
agreed to the withdrawal of funds. At his home in the village of D., A. L. held up his statement from 
the Agricultural Bank of Greece for December 2005. On Dec. 28, he received a payment of ¼LQ
subsidies  for  olive  oil,  even  though  he  farms  only  150  trees  and  would  normally  claim  several 
KXQGUHG(XURV7KDWVDPHGD\DQXQH[SODLQHGGHELWUHPRYHG¼1RRQHFDQH[SODLQWKHGHELW
he said, "not the bank, nor the cooperative. No one can explain how the money came into my account 
or who has taken it." (emphasis added). 
This example uncovers at least two major issues. The first is related to the misalignment of external (from 
the  European  Union)  and  internal  incentives.  The  second  is  related,  instead,  to  internal  governance 
failures  and  represents  a  more  serious  threat  to  the  possibility  of  enhancing  welfare  through  self-
organisation. The impact of environing conditions on the organisation - as depicted by EU policies aimed 
at supporting cooperatives - need to be considered critically, since the results of the interaction between 
external and internal incentives may be far from those initially desired. More fundamentally, however, we 
suggest that the valorisation of intrinsic motivations, which is a distinctive characteristic of non-profit 
organisations, can be attained only when so-called deviant behaviours are prevented and restricted.
9 
Not  so  much  research,  however,  has  been  committed  to  what  enables  self-organised  entrepreneurial 
ventures to be both efficient and effective. Specifically, we relate efficiency with the interplay between 
                                                       
9The importance of control and retaliation in cooperative interactions has been evidenced by behavioural economist 
starting from the seminal contribution by Fehr and Gächter (2000) 
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specific individual values and motivations on the one hand, and firm governance and objectives on the 
other, through the mediating role of the incentive structure. We also suggest that effectiveness responds to 
the ability of self-defined rules and routines to achieve, as a necessary condition (and besides pecuniary 
results), non-monetary outcomes, such as individual satisfaction by means of giving space to the intrinsic 
motivations of individuals. 
Organizational routines can be functional to the achievement of individual wellbeing. At the same time, 
the implementation of constraining rules serves as a precondition for controlling opportunistic behaviours. 
The two aspects of the problem can be put together if rules that reinforce trust and reciprocity are able to 
forestall deviant behaviours and, at the same time, become the repositories of organisational incentives 
and of the ability of the organisation to support intrinsic motivations. Whilst traditional microeconomic 
textbooks  argue  that  monetary  incentives  are,  as  a  rule,  the  main  drivers  of  efficiency,  behavioural 
arguments show that only rules that reflect the shared values of participants and support their motivations 
allow  the  organisation  to  achieve  also  satisfactory  monetary  outcomes.  In  cooperatives,  therefore, 
incentives  should  be  consistent  with  underlying  values  protecting  and  fostering  inclusion,  trust  and 
reciprocal  behaviour.  Production  efficiency  comes  to  depend  on  those  values,  besides  monetary 
incentives.  
 
4. The definition of a new framework of analysis 
Our arguments are tailored to the nature of cooperative firms: where profit is not the major value, the 
dominant  qualities  become  intrinsic  motivations,  non-monetary  incentives  as  well  as  individual 
satisfaction in all its components. In the case of profit-making firms, instead, the dominance of monetary 
drivers endorsed in microeconomic textbooks can retain a more fundamental explanatory power, with 
individual satisfaction attached to monetary returns. 
If we had to understand failure of cooperatives to reach the desired ends, we would need first of all to 
address  their  specificities  and  their  interaction  mechanisms.  We  suggest  a  framework  which 
acknowledges, in particular: 
a) the values and motivations endorsed by self-organised principals when developing governance and 
working rules for the accomplishment of production activities; 
b) the nature of the resources used and the processes of value-added appropriation. 
The basic institutional structure of the organisation is typically defined by law and requires compliance by 
the  members  of  cooperatives.  There  is,  to  put  it  differently,  a  broad  institutional  framework  which 
provides part of the organisational rules. These reflect a number of consolidated values to which the   9 
principals choose to adhere in the first place. Variations, however, occurs. Governance and working rules 
specific to each single organisation are usually inscribed in the organisational protocols and in other forms 
of  self-UHJXODWLRQ GHSHQGLQJ RQ PHPEHUV¶ GLVFUHWLRQDU\ GHFLVLRQV 2VWURP  :LWKLQ WKH
organisation, in particular, routines represent the procedures through which the organisation interacts with 
the external environment and are, therefore, subject to change.
10 
Both legal and self-defined rules identify criteria for managing resources and distributing returns. The 
utilisation and distribution of rivalrous resources, in particular, engenders trade-offs which, in the absence 
of proper regulation, can become unsolvable social dilemmas. Self-defined rules have, therefore, a clear 
place in guiding the appropriation of resources and preventing the exacerbation of conflicting interests. 
Most importantly, when truly reflecting the needs, values and objectives of members, regulation enables 
common activities to develop consistently with individual fulfilment. Recalling the work of Commons 
 S LQVWLWXWLRQV HPSRZHU LQGLYLGXDOV EHLQJ ³FROOHFWLYH DFWLRQ FRQWUROOLQJ OLEerating  and 
H[SDQGLQJLQGLYLGXDODFWLRQ´TXRWHGLQ0LURZVNLS 
The challenge is to unearth the governance characteristics that can be effectively associated with the value 
and resource-specificities of cooperatives. A contribution to the answer may come from considering:  
a) the relevance of non-monetary measures of performance associated with intrinsic motivations and with 
the specific values of the membership;  
b) incentive mixes as an expression of the interdependence between individual values motivations, the 
nature of resources, and organisational values and objectives. 
 
4.1. The design and diffusion of self-defined rules 
Members in self-organised enterprises define and implement their own rules without resorting, at least as 
a matter of course, to external enforcement. In many instances, detailed knowledge of the production 
process and of the socioeconomic context allows members to design rules which are more effective in 
terms of their propensity to lead to desired results than what external regulators would be able to achieve. 
These include both production as well as non monetary measures, such as individual wellbeing (Ostrom, 
1994). We see this as a sheer possibility, whose actual realisation is not guaranteed and requires stringent 
                                                       
10The open-ended nature of institutional evolution has to do, in this case, with the ever changing features of rules 
inside each single organisation and relates to the firm survival and its expansion potentials. We refer here to the 
concept of ontogenetic evolution, more than to the concept of phylogenetic evolution of the institutional set-up of 
the organisation (see Hodgson, 2006). 
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conditions,  especially  in  terms  of  the  consistency  of  rules  with  individual  motivations  and  values. 
Because values evolve over time, subject to experience, similarly rules are understood as evolutionary 
entities which need to be historically contextualised and tested (Dewey, 1977/1940; Cf. Sacchetti and 
7RUWLDIRUDQDQDO\VLVRI'HZH\¶VSHUVSHFWLYHRQYDOXHVDQGSUHIHUHQFHIRUPDWLRQ). We would argue 
that the initial need to which a self-organised membership attach value, and which is reflected by rules, is 
the desire to accomplish common production objectives for the enhancement of inner motivations and the 
improvement of individual wellbeing. 
In this perspective, bonding aspects are to be taken into account at the outset. Respect of reciprocity and 
conditional  cooperation  have  been  argued  to  be  a  necessary  condition  for  improving  organisational 
efficiency and individual wellbeing (Fehr, et al., 2002). It follows that also cooperatives need to detect 
and foreclose deviant behaviours which, however, are not likely to be frequent when individual values, 
motivations, organisational objectives and the incentive structure are consistently aligned and re-aligned 
over time. Control costs, as a consequence, have been shown to be lower in this kind of organisation than 
in for-profit firms (Bartlett et al. 1982). The ongoing self-selection of members on the basis of shared 
values and the establishment of organisational procedures coherent with those values allow cooperatives 
to benefit also from a reduction of transaction costs engendered by opportunism and dishonesty. However, 
the focus of the analysis is, in its essence, not just on the constraining aspects, but on the empowering 
features of in-built rules. 
  
4.2. The governance of common pools of resources 
Rules and routines need to reflect the specificities of non-profit oriented firms, starting from values. 
Whilst respecting specific values, moreover, rules and routines need to address the particular nature of 
resources used and accumulated by cooperatives. These portray some of the features of common pools of 
resources: together with the value added produced, they are rivalrous, but at least partly non-excludable. 
As said, rivalry is related to the scarcity and exhaustibility of resources. It would engender not-emendable 
social contrast in the absence of proper regulation. Non-excludability is one of the most characterising 
features of cooperative firms, and derives from the inclusive nature of governance rules in democratic 
organisational settings. Decision making and appropriation rights guarantee members to have a say in the 
management of common resources and in the distribution of the value added, while non-members could, 
as a norm, be excluded from the appropriation of the non-contracted parts of the value added. Rivalry is 
addressed by the rules defining appropriation. The latter, is crucially influenced by specific procedures 
that the same members of the organisation are called to create, approve, and implement. Different rules 
and routines can shift the balance in favour different appropriators, who need to deliberate on what needs 
and aims should be recognised and, then, infuse their  evaluation into choices.  In particular strategic   11 
decisions are a synthesis of such a process and impact on assessments about, for example, how to share 
resources or invest for the future development of the organisation. 
The time horizon of decision making is also crucial, since increased or quicker appropriation by some 
members  can  often  reduce  or  slow  down  appropriation  by  other  members  in  the  future.  Unless 
organisational  outcomes  can  be  represented  as  win-win  situations,  which  cannot  be  presumed  to  be 
always the case, trade-offs in the distribution of resources need to be addressed carefully as a matter of 
course.  As  a  consequence  of  rivalry  and  non-excludability,  conflict  is  always  a  looming  risk  in 
entrepreneurial forms run by self-organised principals. While no optimal solution can be expected to 
HPHUJHIURPWKHPHPEHUV¶LQWHUDFWLRQIRUPDOLVHGSURFHGXUHVDQGFXVWRPV6FKOLFWK998) play a crucial 
role  in  guaranteeing  clear  standards  of  procedural  and  distributive  fairness    more  than  in  any  other 
organisational form (Tyler and Blader, 2000, 2003).
11   
While various kinds of dilemma emerge also in for-profit firms ± not least regarding distributional aspects 
±  there, it is a decision-maker (or restricted group of decision makers at the top of the hierarchy) that 
holds  control  of  strategic decisions.  In  mutual  benefit  enterprises  there  is  usually  no  such  authority. 
Choices of strategic relevance, therefore, need to be made on the presumption that failures to reach 
decisions can impose substantial costs on the membership and on the other patrons of the organisation, up 
to the disappearance of the organisation itself. But how should processes of decision-making be designed 
in order to keep coherence with the values that back cooperation? 
It has been argued by some critics in the new-institutionalist school that non-profit firms show higher 
ownership costs in the form of decision-making costs (Hansmann, 1996). In reply, Borzaga and Tortia 
(2010) suggest that such conclusions are flawed in at least two respects. First, they stem from the faulty 
idea that decision-making costs cannot be adequately limited in non-profit making firms. Secondly they 
lack to consider routines as repositories of procedural knowledge, both codified and tacit, which support 
organisational processes, including decision making, without necessarily inflating costs. 
Consistently, Ostrom (1994) has demonstrated that self-organised principals can govern common pool of 
resources in an effective way and in some cases more effectively than in the presence of outside control 
under private or public property. This is possible through the evolution of ad hoc rules reflecting context 
specificity. It is a way of recognising the interaction between the organisation and its environment which 
involves, for example, the type of resources available, the characteristics of production organisation, as 
well as cultural elements, such as the initial values of the self-organised principals as reflected in the 
specific choice of organisation. Rules and routines emerge as solutions to specific needs and production 
                                                       
11 The crucial role of distributive and procedural fairness in cooperative firms is fully coinfirmed by empirical 
evidence (Tortia, 2008, 2009)    12 
problems, and function as the coordination mechanisms of activities. They change as needs and objectives 
evolve,  in  the  context  provided  by  a  mutating  environment  that  actively  interacts  with  the  stimuli 
provided  by  the  organisation  and  by  each  individual  within  it.  Because  of  such  interconnectedness, 
working rules evolve jointly with WKHHYROXWLRQRIWKHSULQFLSDOV¶YDOXHVDVZHOODVE\VXJJHVWLQJQRYHO
solutions  to  old  problems.
12 As  an  illustration,  consider  sanctions. Although  not  being  excluded,  the 
definition of sanctions is not the main aim of self-defined rules in cooperatives, whose objective rests, 
instead, with the coordination of production activities, consistently with the accomplishment of welfare 
increasing outcomes. 
 
4.3. Incentive mixes as a reply to specific values and individual motivations 
The governance of common resources in non-profit making firms is a reflection of specific values and 
objectives. These require the formulation of consistent rules, which are however dependent on the context 
and  on  the  features  of  the  production  process.  The  basic  principles  of  self-organisation  should, 
nonetheless, apply to each of these organisations in the same way. Organisational routines and other rules 
define individual actions and behaviour. Still, no rule can be final. Rules are meant to evolve should the 
principals find that there is no resonance between the values embedded in rules and the assessment they 
have evolved over time through experience (Cf. Dewey, 1977/1917). Therefore, if we argue for the need 
of matching individual and organisational objectives, we inevitably acknowledge an evolving equilibrium 
between what the individuals assess as valuable and what is recognised as such by institutions. The 
continuous  scrutiny  of  rules  is  crucial,  as  any  mismatching  would  lower  the  individual  feeling  of 
fulfilment and, therefore wellbeing.  
                                                       
12Interconnectedness between individuals, the organisation, and other environing conditions can be analysed by 
introducing, although not in this paper, a dynamic analysis of the continuous adjustment of individual needs and 
preferences on the one hand, and of organisational change on the other. New-institutionalism is useful to set up 
basic organisational needs, such as honesty and absence of corruption, but these specific µcivic values¶ should not 
be confused with the indeterminateness, plurality and dynamism of individual desires, objectives and preferences. 
Accordingly,  change  in  organisations  must  reflect  change  in  individuals'  desires  and  objectives.  The  rules 
underlying the governance of organisations are considered, therefore, as dynamic and plural. We suggest that, to 
reflect evolutionary dynamics, organisations need to attach value to those processes that keep up the interaction 
between rules and individuals¶ historical evolution of values. 
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A non secondary consequence of the mismatch between individual values and organisational rules and 
routines  would  be  the  emergence  of  X-LQHIILFLHQF\ IRU H[DPSOH LQ WHUPV RI PHPEHUV¶ UHGXFHG
involvement  and  commitment,  or  individual  pursuit  of  aims  at  odds  with  organisational  objectives. 
Because of these reasons, control costs would rise. Orthodox approaches have prescribed a number of 
remedies, ranging from increasing hierarchy to tightening control and pay for performance (Lazear and 
Shaw, 2007). All these cures are liable of increasing costs without guaranteeing expected efficiency (Frey 
and Osterloh, 1999). More fundamentally, however, these solutions are based on the exclusive control of 
strategic  direction  as  well  as  on  instrumental  methods  of  interaction.  One  of  the  consequences  of 
exclusion has been argued to be the generation of strong biases on individual willingness and capability to 
exert their voice and creativity (Sacchetti et al. 2009), thus further reducing feelings of competence, 
autonomy, recognition and, therefore, overall satisfaction (Cf. Ryan & Deci 2000). The negative impact 
on the desire to participate would then reinforce exclusion like in a vicious cycle (Sacchetti et al. 2009). 
In  self-governed  organisations,  however,  the  imposition  of  hierarchical  and  exclusive  rules  is  more 
difficult and more likely to be ineffective, since members with equal rights will tend to reject decisions 
that do not respect fairness and mutuality. Equality, fairness and mutuality would be consistent values to 
be adopted in the management of resources, consistently with the initial choice of the legal form. It 
follows  that  governance  needs  to  be  based  on  the  specific  values  of  cooperatives,  and  innovate  on 
solutions  which  favour  the  fine-tuning  of  decision  mechanisms  and  organisational  objectives  with 
members'  preferences  in  an  inclusive  way.  The  desire  to  reach  consensus,  through  for  example 
deliberation, needs to replace authority, simple transactions and bilateral negotiations in the definition of 
procedures and in their implementation (Sacchetti and Sugden 2009). 
Similarly self-organised principals will choose a mix of incentives which reflects a specific process of 
evaluation  and  apprises  individual  motivation  sets  consistently.  In  particular  it  has  been  argued  that 
monetary  incentives  should  be  adequately  balanced  with  non-monetary  ones,  and  match  individual 
motivations which do not have a specific monetary equivalent (Borzaga and Mittone, 1997; Bacchiaga 
and Borzaga, 2001). Intrinsic motivations often drive individuals because they feel a deep interest in the 
activity carried out. This is true whether this interest entails increased monetary remuneration or not. 
+RZHYHU UHFHQW UHVXOWV FRPLQJ IURP WKH DQDO\VLV RI ZRUNHUV¶ PRWLYDWLRQV LQ VRFLDO cooperatives 
demonstrate that stronger intrinsic motivations are also linked to higher monetary remuneration (wages) 
since they increase effort (Becchetti, et al., 2009).
13 Hence, stronger intrinsic motivations differentiate 
workers  associated  with  high  productivity  from  less  productive  workers.  The  positive  link  between 
                                                       
13This does not imply higher costs in cooperatives with respect to for-profit firms because the average level of wages 
is usually lower for the former (Pencavel, et. al., 2006). 
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intrinsic motivations and productivity widens the scope of the orthodox approach since the link between 
effort and wellbeing appears to be mediated by the role of motivations. 
 
4.4. Interaction 
From our discussion, it follows that the incentive mix offered by non-profit oriented firms should promote 
the intrinsic leverage of activities, even at the cost of lower economic returns. By giving priority to the 
alignment of individual motivations and organisational objectives, individual satisfaction and wellbeing 
improve. The appraisal of non-material returns, however, does not rule out the need to satisfy individuals 
on both pecuniary and non-pecuniary grounds. These two complementary dimensions are a crucial aspect 
of  the  organisation  survival  and  growth.  Rules  and  routines  can  provide  the  mix  of  modalities  for 
incentivizing both extrinsic and intrinsic aspects of individual behaviour. Finally, motivational upholding 
and individual fulfilment cannot be supported only by the formal distribution of participation rights but 
needs  to  be  paired  by  substantive  features  of  the organisational  setting,  such  as  the  transparency  of 
procedures, and the possibility to express autonomous and creative choices.  
The  reversed  pyramid  in  Figure  1  exemplifies  the  interplay  between  the  different  elements  in  the 
framework.  It  accounts,  in  particular,  for  the  interaction  between  the  individual  and  the  institutional 
structure (Hodgson, 2007)
14. The organisation is represented as a stratified entity where the different 
layers  interact  through  specific  connectors:  incentive  mixes.  At  the  base  of  the  pyramid  are  basic 
institutional features which usually undergo a high degree of legal formalisation concerning control and 
appropriation  rights.  Differently,  the  upper  layers  reflect  the  evolving  values  and  propensities  of 
individuals. As such, their impact on rules, let alone the legal definition of control rights, is not observable 
in the immediate future but requires a longer-term perspective. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
At the most fundamental level, control rights allocate control over the broad direction of the organisation 
and over the appropriation of the produce.
15 They are binding in defining who has access to decision-
                                                       
14The aim is not to provide an explanation of why the foundational layers show a strong legal underpinning. We only 
observe that this is the case in most socio-economic systems. 
 
15Control rights and their legal dressing are themselves influenced by values, culture and, in some cases, individual 
motivations.  However,  this  process  of  evolution  of  control  rights  is  likely  to  take  place  in  the  long  run   15 
making; however they do not univocally define how common resources are managed. This pertains to the 
JRYHUQDQFHRIVWUDWHJLFFKRLFHPDNLQJZKLFKLVFUXFLDOO\LQIOXHQFHGE\WKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VVWUXFWXUHDQG
working  rules.  The  nature  of  governance,  at  this  level,  is  chosen  by  the  self-organised  principals, 
reflecting their values and objectives. By framing values and objectives, self-regulation determines also 
the criteria for assessing behaviour. We identify therefore two complementary faces of self-regulation: the 
creative and the binding. If, on the one hand, the definition of rules leaves space for the expression of 
VSHFLILFYDOXHVDQGHQDEOHVSULQFLSDOVWRFUHDWLYHO\VKDSHWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VJRYHUQDQFHRQWKHRWKHUKDQG
rules  have  also  constraining  features.  These  are  directed  to  foreclose  opportunistic  behaviour  and 
guarantee a high degree of compliance with collectively-defined objectives. 
The constraining feature of rules is not meant to impair individual potential, but to ensure that each 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VULJKWWR participate  and  share  results is respected.  Rules  that inhibit inclusion,  from  this 
perspective,  would  be  perceived  as  unfair  and  have  the  undesirable  effect  of  undermining  intrinsic 
motivations. Intrinsic motivation is impaired also when rules are perceived as external to the individual. 
One way to align individual desires and organisational rules is to put in place processes of adjustment 
which can modify rules to reflect the evolving, shared desires of members. Monetary and non-monetary 
incentives, specifically, can prompt the mutual adjustment of individual and organisational objectives. 
More fundamentally, we can say that the interplay between what the individual finds valuable on the one 
hand, and what is recognised as valuable by organisational rules, on the other, attaches meaning to tasks 
and supports individual intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1975; Rayan & Deci, 2000). 
Intrinsic motivations are located at the top layer of the scheme. Their full expression represents the 
highest  attainment  of  the  organisational  structure  insofar  as  it  increases  individual  wellbeing  and 
improves production performance.
 16 Our scheme, therefore, identifies the benchmark for assessing the 
impact of an organisation in the ability of the combined action of control rights and working rules to 
                                                                                                                                                                           
(Williamson, 2000). Because of this reason, this work considers control rights as given and, as said in footnote 7, it 
is cast in terms of ontogenetic, more than phylogenetic evolution (Hodgson, 2006). 
 
16³Perhaps no single phenomenon reflects the positive potential of human nature as much as intrinsic motivation, the 
inherent tendency to seek out novelty and challenges, to extend and exercise one's capacities, to explore, and to 
OHDUQ«7KHFRQVWUXFWRILQWULQVLFPRWLYDWLRQGHVFULEHVWKLVQDWXUDOLQFOLQDWLRQWRZDUGDVVLPLODWLRQPDVtery, 
spontaneous interest, and exploration that is so essential to cognitive and social development and that represents a 
SULQFLSDOVRXUFHRIHQMR\PHQWDQGYLWDOLW\WKURXJKRXWOLIH´Deci and Rayan, 2000). 
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HQDEOHWKHIXOOH[SUHVVLRQRILQGLYLGXDOV¶LQWULQVLFPRWLYDWLRQV
17 This occurs if there is mutual adjustment 
over time between individual values and the values recognised by institutions. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Cooperative firms have been studied mainly by neoclassical and by new-institutionalist schools. Both of 
them were born and thrive in the context provided by capitalist institutions. Their inner values and logic 
in  explaining  economic  phenomena  appears  largely  functional  to  the  development  of  the  capitalist 
economic system, which is mostly populated by profit-oriented firms. However, when these values have 
been applied to different kinds of enterprises, such as cooperatives and other typologies of non-profit 
oriented firms, results have been limited and inconclusive, at time inconsistent or contradictory (Borzaga, 
et al., 2009). Besides the unsatisfactory results of economic analysis, recurring scandals have reinforced 
the negative appraisal of cooperative organisations. 
The application of unsuitable conceptual tools is at the roots of flawed understanding of organisations that 
pursue mutual benefit objectives, and calls for a redefinition of the issues. In developing a coherent 
framework of analysis we have considered firms as entrepreneurial associations driven by self-organised 
collective action in which members are granted democratic and non-saleable control rights. We have 
suggested that what is ultimately distinctive in explaining the choice and implementation of rules by the 
same priQFLSDOVZKRFUHDWHDQGUXQWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQLVWKHSULQFLSDOV¶VHWRIVKDUHGYDOXHVDQGREMHFWLYHV
(Cf. Sacchetti and Tortia 2010).   
The  accomplishment  of  an  adequate  framework  of  analysis  for  the  study  of  the  management  and 
appropriation  of  common  pools  of  resources  in  non-profit  oriented  firms  is  more  relevant  than  in 
traditional profit maximising firms because control rights are distributed in a participatory way and have a 
personal character, i.e. they are attributed to person-members and not to shares of capital (Borzaga and 
Tortia, 2009). Democratic participation in cooperative firms implies that the outcomes and the procedures 
concerning  each  individual  member  depend  on  the  preferences  expressed  by  other  members.  The 
interconnectedness of results both at the individual level and at the organisational level is institutionally 
recognised by means of mutual dependence and inclusive governance. This raises a whole set of questions 
connected with the rivalrous and non-excludable nature of the resources employed and of the value added 
produced  by  cooperative  firms.  Our  framework  of  analysis  represents  a  way  of  acknowledging  and 
                                                       
17Intrinsic  motivations  find  spontaneous  expression  in  each  single  individual.  Here  we  highlight  that  their  full 
expression  in  the  organisational  realm  requires  adequate  institutional  preconditions,  which  are  likely  to  be 
particularly favourable in self-organised entrepreneurial ventures.   
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explicitly addressing ± through the checks and balances of a democratic decision making system - the 
dangers connected with opportunism. More crucially, cooperative governance is about at least ensuring 
that all the members can have a voice in the decision-making system, thus improving the compatibility 
between individual and organisational needs and objectives.  
 These enabling features work only when relations inside the firm are based on trust and reciprocating 
behaviours, since each individual position is not independent of the positions and behaviours of the other 
members. The spread of opportunism can be particularly dangerous where intrinsic motivation is at the 
heart  of  activities.
18  Opportunism  can  easily  undermine  the  alignment  of  individual  motivations  and 
collective objectives, endangering firm survival and growth. However, when opportunism is kept at bay 
by  proper  rules,  members'  rights  of  inclusion  are  strengthened  and  enable  the  fullest  expression  of 
intrinsic motivations, which, in turn, foster the use of creative potential in people, their satisfaction as well 
as organisational productivity. 
The choice of including intrinsic elements in the incentive mix provides consistency and resilience to the 
organisation.  The  incentive  system  develops  through  an  open-ended  trial  and  error  process,  while 
monetary outcomes are regarded as part of the end result rather than what drives economic activity. The 
example  of  frauds  occurred  in  the  agricultural  sector  showcases  some  circumscribed,  but  relevant, 
difficulties  linked  to  the  actualisation  of  self-governed  entrepreneurial  forms.  These  difficulties  are 
connected  with  the  necessity  to  govern  and  distribute  limited  resources  characterised  by  non-
excludability. The discussion also shows that the dark side of cooperation, which becomes apparent when 
deviant behaviours are not properly restricted, can be rescued if strong  emphasis is put on the formal 
elaboration  of  effective  governance  and  working  mechanisms  that  reinforce  underlying  and  evolving 
values, as well as on the quality of relationships. In this context, we suggest that the creation of an 
inclusive and fair environment, cleared as much as possible from unbalances related to opportunism, is 
one of the preconditions for the development of activities in line with the intrinsic motivation and creative 
potential of individuals. 
                                                       
18While in new institutionalism (Williamson, 1975) opportunism has a substantive role in individual behaviour 
(human beings are opportunist by their very nature), in our framework opportunism represents juts one possible 
behavioural pattern, and indeed an evolving one. Hence opportunism represent a simple obstacle to the 
accomplishment of cooperative behaviours, and to the flourishing of intrinsic motivations. 
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Figure 1 - Cooperative organisations explained: the reversed pyramid of interconnections between control rights, working rules and 
outcomes. 
Choice of Legal Framework/Control rights 
They define the basic decision making processes and 
appropriation patterns of self-organised principals 
Choice of working rules and governance structure The 
management of common pool of resources 
requires a structure and working rules, both constraining and 
enabling. Rules emerge and develop to support the 
evolutionary potential of the organisation  
Choice of outcomes: focus on non-monetary outcomes 
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